Judge Jones' constitutional interpretation fails proposed "compelling reason" test

Judge "Jackass" Jones' "true religion" interpretation of the Constitution's establishment clause fails a new test that I am proposing, which I call the "compelling reason" test. I am defining this test as follows: when a constitutional interpretation cannot be derived explicitly or implicitly from the language of the Constitution, such an interpretation is valid only if it serves a truly compelling purpose. An example of such an interpretation is the prohibition on shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre -- such a prohibition is not explicit or implicit in the freedom of speech clause. I am using the word "interpretation" here very loosely, since the word usually means an explanation or clarification of the meanings of some words but here there are no words to interpret -- I am using the word "interpret" in the second sense given in the AOL's online dictionary: " 2. to conceive in the light of individual belief, judgment, or circumstance : construe." I also propose the following rules: (1) the "compelling reason" test should not be strictly applied to constitutional interpretations that are not used as the basis for a court decision, and (2) the test should apply only to general principles and not to how those principles apply to a specific situation (IMO there should be some allowance for differences of opinion as to how a "compelling reason" principle applies in a specific situation). I propose this "compelling reason" test for the purpose of helping to reduce arbitrariness, capriciousness, subjectivity, and general "activism" and "legislating from the bench" in judicial opinions. Judges are merely told that they should not be "activists" or should not "legislate from the bench," without being given a set of principles or guidelines that they should follow to avoid those things.

As I noted above, an example of a judicial principle that satisfies the "compelling reason" test is the famous prohibition on shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre. This prohibition cannot be expressly derived from the freedom of speech clause of the 1st amendment but is obviously necessary for compelling reasons. Another example of a judicial principle that satisfies the "compelling reason" test is the so-called "dormant commerce clause." The Constitution grants Congress the power to impose burdens on interstate commerce but does not expressly prohibit the states from imposing such burdens without the permission of Congress, so the courts, realizing that allowing states an unrestricted right to burden interstate commerce would result in chaos, invented a "dormant commerce clause" which denies such an unrestricted right. Another judicial principle of the courts allows -- for truly compelling reasons -- exceptions to the dormant commerce clause.

Judge Jones' "true religion" interpretation of the establishment clause fails this proposed test -- the interpretation cannot be derived from the language of the establishment clause, and there was no compelling reason for the interpretation, even if it is supposed that maintaining the separation of church and state is truly compelling. Judge Jones showed extreme prejudice against intelligent design and the Dover defendants by saying in a Dickinson College commencement speech that his Kitzmiller v. Dover decision was based on his cockamamie notion that the Founders based the establishment clause upon a belief that organized religions are not "true" religions [link]:

Ironically, but perhaps fittingly for my purposes today, we see the Founders' ideals quite clearly, among many places, in the Establishment Clause within the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This of course was the clause that I determined the school board had violated in the Kitzmiller v. Dover case. While legal scholars will continue to debate the appropriate application of that clause to particular facts in individual cases, this much is very clear. The Founders believed that true religion was not something handed down by a church or contained in a Bible, but was to be found through free, rational inquiry. At bottom then, this core set of beliefs led the Founders, who constantly engaged and questioned things, to secure their idea of religious freedom by barring any alliance between church and state.

Unfortunately, the original speech is no longer posted on the Dickinson College website.

Ironically, Judge Jones gave the speech while standing behind the Dickinson College seal, which was designed by USA Founders Benjamin Rush and John Dickinson and which contains a picture of an open bible and the college motto, in Latin, which translates, "religion and learning, the bulwark of liberty." Also, Judge Jones has claimed that the work of judges is "workmanlike," but there is nothing workmanlike about his "true religion" interpretation of the establishment clause.

Believe it or not, some trolls -- Kevin Vicklund and others -- claimed that I misinterpreted Judge Jones' above statement. But no statement could be clearer --"church" and "Bible" represent organized religions, and Judge Jones said that "true religion was not something handed down by a church or contained in a Bible." Under the principles of Social Darwinism, these trolls would be euthanized to protect themselves and others from the possible consequences of their own stupidity, or at least would be sterilized to prevent them from transmitting their mental defectiveness to future generations.

Law professor Robert Tsai, in a post on the Volokh Conspiracy blog, comments about his book Eloquence and Reason:

Because the text of the First Amendment has never changed, those interested in constitutional transformation have always used text instrumentally to secure a hegemony of preferred values, outlooks, and modes of talking about the provision. Whether insiders admit it or not, the task of judging involves sorting through competing claims to determine which cultural and political perspectives ought to be validated and which ones should be resisted. Judges have always played a role in this social process, even if theirs is rarely the last word on a subject. There is no such thing as neutral interpretation; there is only how transparent an interpreter chooses to be about her methodologies and substantive commitments.

"Eloquence and Reason" examines historical episodes in which activists, lawyers, and presidents such as FDR and Ronald Reagan worked to dislodge reigning constitutional ideas and reshape our understandings of free speech and religious freedom . . . .

A second episode has to do with the Anti-Establishment Clause. The “wall of separation” metaphor appeared as part of an official post-war strategy to keep the peace. As originally conceived, Justice Black’s version of the boundary idea conveyed liberalism’s commitment to equal respect, to the protection and empowerment of religious minorities, and to guaranteeing a strong state uncorrupted or divided by religious strife.

Over time, these connotations were consciously reconfigured through litigation, activism, and the electoral process. Through a process of composition, reaction, adaptation, and dissolution, the wall of separation began to acquire negative connotations. Those outside of the courts began to say that the wall signified hostility or discrimination, oppression of religious minorities, and a state weakened by the alienation of its citizens. Eventually judges endorsed this way of describing the wall of separation, shunning it as a trope and divorcing it from their analyses of the controversies that arose.

The title of the book, "Eloquence and Reason," is a misnomer -- what the book criticizes is not reasonable or eloquent (of course, it would be hard to be both unreasonable and eloquent).
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Brazen religious indoctrination

David Barton is one of six "experts" chosen by the Texas Board of Education to advise the board on making changes to the Social Studies TEKS (Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills) standards. His TEKS review submitted to the board says (pages 11-12),

(quoting first 126 words of the Declaration of Independence)When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

(It is from this section that students are to recite by memory under state law.)
The principles set forth here and subsequently secured in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights include:

1. There is a fixed moral law derived from God and nature

2. There is a Creator

3. The Creator gives to man certain unalienable rights

4. Government exists primarily to protect God-given rights to every individual

5. Below God-given rights and moral law, government is directed by the consent of the government

Students must also understand the Framers' very explicit (and very frequent) definition of inalienable rights as being those rights given by God to every individual, independent of any government anywhere . . . . These fundamental five precepts of American government must be thoroughly understood by students, but they are not currently addressed in the TEKS.

Telling students that god is the source of their human rights is brazen religious indoctrination, especially when at the same time ignoring other sources and bases of those rights. For example, it can be argued purely on the basis of logic -- without any reference to a god at all -- that there is no good reason to deny someone a right when exercise of that right would not infringe upon the rights of others. Indeed, determining whether or not the rights of others are infringed upon provides a basis for determining what should be a right and what should not, whereas deciding what rights should be considered god-given is arbitrary. Also, I said in a previous post,
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Marshall [another fundy crackpot chosen as one of the 6 experts] and Barton are just plain wrong -- there is nothing in the Constitution that says that it is based on religion, nor is there anything in the Constitution that links that document to the Declaration of Independence, which does have religious references. One would think that if the Founders wanted people to think that the Constitution is based on the bible, the Constitution would say that it is based on the bible. . . . . . . . . .Marshall and Barton are putting words in the mouths of the Founders, viewing the Constitution as a document inspired by and based on religion when the Constitution itself does not have anything that supports that view. Furthermore, IMO the principles of liberty and democracy should be regarded as universal and not particularly based on the US Constitution or the Declaration of Independence, regardless of whether or not those documents are derived from religious beliefs. It is a myth that the Declaration of Independence originated the ideas of liberty and democracy. I assert that the American Revolution's purpose was not to establish a new form of government -- the governments that the colonies had after independence were not that much different from the governments they had before independence, the only real difference being that the colonies were independent of Britain. The American Revolution was primarily just the result of the harsh so-named "Intolerable Acts," which Britain enacted in response to the Boston Tea Party.

BTW, here is Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney's interpretation of those first 126 words of the Constitution, from the Dred Scott decision:

The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of mankind to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.

So one of the things that the Declaration of Independence has done hss been to expose the hypocrisy of people like Justice Taney -- and some of the Founders themselves.

As for the statement, "It is from this section that students are to recite by memory under state law," I could find no such requirement in the current 5th-grade Texas social studies TEKS, and I see no reason why there should be such a requirement.

Barton's TEKS review says (page 12-13),

The Dual Documents of American Government. The TEKS should stipulate (but currently do not) that the Declaration of Independence is symbiotic with the Constitution rather than a separate unrelated document . . . . Only in recent years have the Declaration and the Constitution wrongly been viewed as independent rather than inseparable and interdependent documents.

Obviously, Barton's main reason for trying to link the Constitution to the Declaration of Independence is that the latter document refers to a "creator," "divine providence," etc. whereas the former document does not. He is not fooling anybody. Would our Constitution be any less valid if there had been no American Revolution and no Declaration of Independence?

Barton said (page 12),

Significantly, the Constitution directly attaches itself to the Declaration by dating itself from the year of the Declaration of Independence rather than from 1787, the year of its writing

Barton is really desperate here in his efforts to attach the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution. The Constitution only mentions (in the signature section) that the constitutional convention adopted the Constitution in the twelfth year of the independence of the USA -- the Declaration of Independence itself is not even mentioned. Also, I don't know what David Barton means about the Constitution "dating itself" -- the signature section gives the date of the Constitution's adoption by the constitutional convention, Sept. 17, 1987:

Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the states present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of the independence of the United States of America the twelfth.

I am surprised that Barton has not seized upon the conventional statement "year of our Lord" as evidence that the Constitution is based upon the word of god.

Also, Barton's TEK review did not say where the above dates are stated in the Constitution -- I had to find the location myself. He also did not give a reference for a quote of a Supreme Court opinion. This TEKS review is very poorly documented.

Barton said (page 12),

In fact, to this day every federal law passed by Congress as well as every presidential act is dated not to the Constitution but to the Declaration

Barton is really talking through his hat here. I have read a lot of federal laws and none are dated to either the Constitution or the Declaration. And I am aware of just one constitutional provision that is dated to the adoption of the Constitution, and that is the 20-year ban on federal interference with slave importation, the first clause of Sec. 9 of Article I:

The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight . . . .

Barton says (page 12),

Additionally, the admission of territories as States into the United States was typically predicated on an assurance by the state that its constitution would violate neither the Constitution nor the principles of the Declaration.

As usual, Barton provides no reference to back up this statement. It is hard to imagine something constitutional that would violate the Declaration.

One state, Utah, did have difficulty in getting admitted, and the reason was polygamy -- Utah was not admitted until its constitution banned polygamy. But polygamy does not violate the US Constitution, so here a state was denied admission because of something that did not violate the US Constitution. So the US government has expected more than just adherence to the US Constitution (and maybe the Declaration) as a condition for admission.

David Barton clearly has an ax to grind here: the indoctrination of Texas students in his religious beliefs. I am no big fan of Americans United for Separation of Church and State, but here is a good AUSCS article about David Barton.

Also, Barton's TEKS review has various trivia and dogmas, e.g., "Nowhere in the TEKS is definition given to who constitutes a Founding Father, and the current definition is dramatically different from the historic definition" (page 13); "Missing in the TEKS is any identification that the government of America is a constitutional republic" (page 14); "Also, completely absent from the TEKS is any mention of the Electoral College system and its benefits -- how it allows small states to have a voice, thus preserving the bicameral nature of America's constitutional government, allowing both the people and the states to have a voice in the selection of a president" (page 21 -- this statement ignores the many criticisms of the Electoral College system). David Barton is basically saying that the way social studies is being taught now is completely wrong and that he wants social studies to be taught his way.

It is too bad that there aren't any members of the Texas board of education who support balance in evolution education without also supporting crackpots like David Barton. It doesn't have to be that way. And it is especially annoying when all supporters of balance in evolution education are lumped together with the likes of David Barton.
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Religion's influence on US history: Putting words in the Founders' mouths

I define "pseudo-originalism" as putting words in the Founders' mouths; i.e., giving the Constitution and other historical documents a meaning that cannot be derived from the express words of the documents. In a previous post, I condemned the pseudo-originalism of crackpot activist Judge John E. "Jackass" Jones the III, who said in a Dickinson College commencement speech that his Kitzmiller v. Dover decision was based on his cockamamie notion that the Founders based the establishment clause upon a belief that organized religions are not "true" religions. The fundies' notion that the USA was founded as a "Christian nation" is just as bad. An ABC News article says,

The debate about whether to teach religious-based social studies in Texas public schools has dominated a broader discussion about the schools' curriculum, which is undergoing a review by state officials hoping to improve the nation's second-largest school system.

The term "religious-based social studies" falsely implies that the issue here is teaching religion in the public schools -- the real issue is teaching about the influence of religion on American history.

The ABC News article continues,
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"Of the six experts appointed in the spring by the 15-member Texas Board of Education to review the state's K-12 curriculum, three have said they would like to see more attention paid to the religious aspects of American history.

"The foremost problem that I see is that there is not nearly enough emphasis or credit given to the biblical motivations of America's settlers and founders," Evangelical minister Peter Marshall, the president of the Massachusetts-based Peter Marshall Ministries and one of the experts on the panel, told ABCNews.com.

"Our children need to know the truth about how our country got started," Marshall said.

"You never read about how the founding fathers were nearly all Christian believers and that it is their biblical world view that shaped the way they thought and achieved what they did," he said . . . .

. . . . . .David Barton, president of the Texas-based Christian heritage advocacy group WallBuilders, is another expert on the panel who would like to see changes made to the school curriculum.

"I think there should be more of an emphasis on history in the social studies curriculum," Barton said. "If there is an emphasis on history, there will be a demonstration of religion."

In his written review of the curriculum, for example, Barton argues that in order for fifth-grade students to fully understand how the American government was formed, they must also understand that it was rooted in religion.

"Students must also understand the framers' very explicit (and very frequent) definition of inalienable rights as being those rights given by God," Barton wrote.

Barton told ABCNews.com that he believes Texas' public school curriculum should "reflect the fact that the U.S. Constitution was written with God in mind."

But Dan Quinn, communications director for the Texas Freedom Network, an organization he says is dedicated to countering the conservative religious right in the state, said that what Barton and Marshall are proposing is a direct violation of the separation of church and state.

Marshall and Barton are just plain wrong -- there is nothing in the Constitution that says that it is based on religion, nor is there anything in the Constitution that links that document to the Declaration of Independence, which does have religious references. One would think that if the Founders wanted people to think that the Constitution is based on the bible, the Constitution would say that it is based on the bible. IMO Barton's main reason for trying to link the Constitution to the Declaration of Independence is that the latter document refers to a "creator," "divine providence," etc. whereas the former document does not. Marshall and Barton are putting words in the mouths of the Founders, viewing the Constitution as a document inspired by and based on religion when the Constitution itself does not have anything that supports that view. Furthermore, IMO the principles of liberty and democracy should be regarded as universal and not particularly based on the US Constitution or the Declaration of Independence, regardless of whether or not those documents are derived from religious beliefs. It is a myth that the Declaration of Independence originated the ideas of liberty and democracy. I assert that the American Revolution's purpose was not to establish a new form of government -- the governments that the colonies had after independence were not that much different from the governments they had before independence, the only real difference being that the colonies were independent of Britain. The American Revolution was primarily just the result of the harsh so-named "Intolerable Acts," which Britain enacted in response to the Boston Tea Party.

Also, the notion that the USA was founded with a simon-pure "wall of separation between church and state" is almost entirely based on the views -- and often the misrepresented or exaggerated views -- of just two of the Founders, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Even the religious views of George Washington himself are largely ignored. Ironically, when Judge John E. Jones III said in his Dickinson College commencement speech that his Kitzmiller v. Dover decision was based on his cockamamie notion that the Founders based the Constitution's establishment clause upon a belief that organized religions are not "true" religions, he was standing behind the college seal, which was designed by USA Founders Benjamin Rush and John Dickinson and which contains a picture of an open bible and the Latin college motto meaning, "religion and learning, the bulwark of liberty." The hypocritical separationists condemn the "Christian nation" notion of the fundies but have not condemned and have even approved Judge Jones' "true religion" speech. Even the Supreme Court has rejected the notion of a simon-pure "wall of separation between church and state," saying in Lynch v. Donnelly,

The concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. The metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.

No significant segment of our society, and no institution within it, can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the other parts, much less from government. "It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation. . . ." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973). Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.

IMO we should certainly take the thoughts of the Founders into consideration -- indeed, some of them were very wise. But the Founders thoughts should be taken with a grain of salt. Also, the notion that our current policies should be based on the beliefs of the Founders has resulted in gross distortions of history. As a result of this notion, the Founders have been portrayed as everything from a bunch of bible-pounding, holy-rolling fundies to a bunch of godless, blasphemous atheists.
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Activist Judge "Jackass" Jones' pseudo-originalism

Judge "Jackass" Jones, poster child for activist judges

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There has been a big debate going on over the legitimacy of "originalism" as a means of constitutional interpretation [link] [link] [link -- group of blog articles concerning originalism ], but Judge "Jackass" Jones' "Founders' true religion" interpretation of the establishement clause is not even genuine originalism -- it is pseudo-originalism. If originalists like Robert Bork and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas are often regarded as crackpots, then what can be said of Judge Jones?

Judge Jones said in a commencement speech at Dickinson College,
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Ironically, but perhaps fittingly for my purposes today, we see the Founders' ideals quite clearly, among many places, in the Establishment Clause within the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This of course was the clause that I determined the school board had violated in the Kitzmiller v. Dover case. While legal scholars will continue to debate the appropriate application of that clause to particular facts in individual cases, this much is very clear. The Founders believed that true religion was not something handed down by a church or contained in a Bible, but was to be found through free, rational inquiry. At bottom then, this core set of beliefs led the Founders, who constantly engaged and questioned things, to secure their idea of religious freedom by barring any alliance between church and state.

Judge Jones claimed that he got the above "true religion" idea from his undergraduate days at Dickinson College, but the statement is actually a quote mine plagiarized from a book that was published long after he graduated. [link] Some have claimed that it is not a plagiarism because quote marks and a citation are shown in the Dickinson College website's copy of the speech, but the quote marks were not added for several days and the oral speech itself had no indication of quotation. Furthermore, it is not a merely a quote but is a quote mine because the original statement was selectively quoted in a way that changed the original meaning. [link]

Two of the principal kinds of originalism are "original meaning" (a kind of "textualism") and "intentionalism." Wikipedia says of original meaning,

Original meaning is the dominant form of the legal theory of originalism today. It was made popular by Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. It contends that the terms of the United States Constitution should be interpreted as meaning what they meant when they were ratified, which is to say, it asks the question: "What would a reasonable person living at the time of ratification have understood these words to mean?"

"Original meaning" is a kind of textualism, which can be the current meaning of the Constitution or other legal authorities. The problem with original-meaning originalism is that it does not recognize changes in circumstances and societal standards. For example, in regard to changes in societal standards, the Founders had a much different view than we do in regard to how Constitutional protections should be applied to women and racial minorities and what Constitutional protections are needed by women and minorities. In regard to changes in circumstances, the Founders never had to consider how the establishment clause would apply to the teaching of evolution, so original-meaning originalism is of little or no help in illuminating that application of the establishment clause.

"Intentionalist" is defined as follows:

Intentionalist: An originalist who gives primary weight to the intentions of framers, members of proposing bodies, and ratifiers.

Intentionalism is on particularly shaky ground as a method of interpreting the Constitution. Some problems are: (1) There were many Founders and they had different intentions; (2) after a span of more than two centuries, it is difficult to discern the Founders' intentions; and (3) as with original-meaning originalism, it does not recognize changes in circumstances and societal standards.

But for original meaning or intentionalism to be applied at all, there has be to something in the Constitution to be given meaning or intent. For example, intentionalism might illuminate the Founders' reasons for putting "well-regulated militia" in the 2nd amendment's right to keep and bear arms. But the establishment clause only says that "Congress shall make no law . . . respecting an establishment of religion." There is nothing there that has anything to do with "true religion." There is nothing there that can be given meaning or intent in regard to "true religion." "Intentionalism" does not mean that any idea can be just pulled out of the air and be claimed to represent the intent of a particular clause of the Constitution. Even if it can be shown that all or most of the Founders held a particular idea, there is no reason to believe -- and good reason to disbelieve -- that they wanted that idea to be part of the Constitution when they did not put that idea in the Constitution. Judge Jones' "true religion" idea is as bad as the fundies' idea that the USA was established as a "Christian nation."

It might be argued that Judge Jones tacitly repudiated or retracted his "true religion" idea. I have not heard him repeat the idea -- for example, he did not mention the idea in his talk at Case-Western Reserve University last year. However, I don't think that his "true religion" statement can be lightly dismissed as just a gaffe or a faux pas -- the statement must have represented his true beliefs at the time and probably represents his true beliefs now. The statement implies that Jones would go out of his way to attack anything he thinks might be associated with organized religion. The statement showed extreme prejudice against intelligent design and the Dover defendants, regardless of whether or not ID is a religious concept.

Judge Jones says that he is not an "activist judge." Bullshit. He is a poster child for activist judges.
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Darwinists' double standard on Jefferson

The Prayer at Valley Forge by Arnold Friberg

* Sung to the tune of Old-Time Religion

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An article in Evolution News & Views says,

When Stephen C. Meyer wrote an op-ed in the Boston Globe on Thomas Jefferson as a proto-ID supporter, outraged science journalist Callaway at the New Scientist [use this link -- the link in EN&V is wrong] couldn’t even mount an argument. He calls linking Jefferson and ID a “ridiculous assertion.” But he doesn’t tell us why it’s ridiculous.

The Darwinists have a hypocritical double standard -- they are allowed to invoke Thomas Jefferson and the other Founders but the critics of Darwinism are not. In his commencement speech at Dickinson College, Judge John E. Jones III had Jefferson in particular in mind (in fact, he praised Jefferson in his speech) when he said that his Kitzmiller v. Dover decision was based on his cockamamie notion that the Founders based the establishment clause upon a belief that organized religions are not "true" religions -- he said,

. . . .this much is very clear. The Founders believed that true religion was not something handed down by a church or contained in a Bible, but was to be found through free, rational inquiry. At bottom then, this core set of beliefs led the Founders, who constantly engaged and questioned things, to secure their idea of religious freedom by barring any alliance between church and state.

Intelligent Design is in fact part of Jefferson's "true religion."

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Teacher's anti-creationism remark violated 1st Amendment, judge rules

A news article says,

SANTA ANA – A Mission Viejo high school history teacher violated the First Amendment by disparaging Christians during a classroom lecture, a federal judge ruled today.

James Corbett, a 20-year teacher at Capistrano Valley High School, referred to Creationism as “religious, superstitious nonsense” during a 2007 classroom lecture, denigrating his former Advanced Placement European history student, Chad Farnan.

The decision is the culmination of a 16-month legal battle between Corbett and Farnan – a conflict the judge said should remind teachers of their legal “boundaries” as public school employees.

"Corbett states an unequivocal belief that Creationism is 'superstitious nonsense,'" U.S. District Court Judge James Selna said in a 37-page ruling released from his Santa Ana courtroom. "The court cannot discern a legitimate secular purpose in this statement, even when considered in context."

In a December 2007 lawsuit, Farnan, then a sophomore, accused Corbett of repeatedly promoting hostility toward Christians in class and advocating "irreligion over religion" in violation of the First Amendment's establishment clause.

In 2007, there was a rally of 200 protesters who supported the teacher [link] --
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MISSION VIEJO – To an almost continuous stream of blaring car horns and cheering, more than 200 Capistrano Valley High School students and alumni rallied outside their school Wednesday morning to show support for embattled history teacher James Corbett, who is being sued by one of his students for making remarks about Christianity and traditional Christian viewpoints in class . . .

“I support Corbett because he’s a teacher who supported free speech and allowed us to discuss in an intelligent way,” said protestor Matt Yee, 17, a junior who took AP European history with Corbett last year . . . .

Down the street from the school, at Via Escolar and Marguerite Parkway, about 10 supporters of Farnan held up signs that read "Freedom from hate" and "Stop Dr. Corbett’s Intolerance." . . .

Corbett's critics say he monopolizes much of his class time promoting liberal viewpoints and leaves little room for students to interject . . . .

Also Wednesday morning, Pastor Wiley Drake of the First Southern Baptist Church of Buena Park visited the school, leading a small prayer vigil for Farnan and doing an Internet radio broadcast for RepublicRadio.com on the controversy.

"We object to Mr. Corbett,” said the Rev. Rod McDougal, who came up from San Diego for the prayer vigil. “We don't want him strung up; we want him fired."

IMO the judge's decision is reasonable. The teacher just went too far, and the judge had to draw the line somewhere. There were charges that the teacher made several other statements that allegedly violated the 1st Amendment and the judge dismissed those charges.

The Corbett case is discussed on:

Volokh Conspiracy, a law blog

Religion Clause, a law blog

Sleazy PZ Myers' Pharyngula blog

Fatheaded Ed Brayton's Dispatches from the Culture Wars blog

Note: this post has been revised since it was first published. The reference to Seiman v. Cobb County -- a reference which I now consider to be inappropriate -- was removed.
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Pettifogging Darwinist attorney Timothy Sandefur

Timothy Sandefur is a pettifogging Darwinist attorney who frequently posts articles on the Panda's Thumb blog. He is now in a blog war with the Discovery Institute's Michael Egnor over the constitutionality of teaching criticisms of evolution in the public schools. Sandefur writes on his hypocritically named "Freespace" blog,

The Big Lie of Intelligent Design is that it’s science. It’s not, of course: it’s a religious viewpoint.

Wrong. ID has religious implications, but it is not necessarily a religious viewpoint. Evolution theory also has religious implications. Evolution theory has been called "the creation story of atheism," and the 7th circuit court of appeals said in Kaufman v. McCaughtry(2005), "The Supreme Court has recognized atheism as equivalent to a "religion" for purposes of the First Amendment on numerous occasions . . ." (page 4)

Sandefur continues,
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It’s an effort to say that there are such-and-such problems with the scientific explanation of the origin of species and therefore, God The Designer must have put these things together. (This is called “strengths and weaknesses”.) It’s an effort to say that critters are just too complicated to have evolved, therefore God The Designer must have intentionally devised them. (This is called “irreducible complexity.”)

It is unconstitutional to teach in public schools that "goddidit." However, it is not unconstitutional to teach that intelligent design and irreducible complexity are weaknesses or criticisms of evolution theory.

Sandefur says in a comment thread under his own article on Panda's Thumb,

The Establishment Clause is not an exception to the right of free speech, because government has no constitutional right of free speech; only persons –- not governments –- have that right.

I disagree -- governments also have a freedom-of-expression right, but that right of governments -- just like individuals' freedom-of-expression right -- has limitations. The limitations are different for governments and individuals. The establishment clause is a limitation on governments' right of freedom of expression. Also, the establishment clause does not prohibit government officials from expressing their own religious views just so long as it is clear that those views are not official views of the government.

I think it’s best to avoid using terminology that suggests that governments have rights. Governments have prerogatives, or discretion to act, or sovereignty. But rights are something only individuals can have. Although sometimes terms like “states rights” or “the rights of the government” are sometimes used as a shorthand to mean “states have the authority to do such and such and cannot be stopped by another government when they try to do such and such,” that terminology is misleading.

This is sophistry and pettifoggery. Governments have rights, just as individuals have rights. For example, the US Constitution and its amendments define the rights of governments as well as the rights of individuals.

No legitimate government has rights valid against the people.

Wrong. One of the most obvious rights that a legitimate government can have against the people is the right to tax.

And Sandefur is a real hypocrite. While he pretends to believe in a strict interpretation of the establishment clause, he opposed the Caldwell v. Caldwell lawsuit against the UC Berkeley "Understanding Evolution" website, a publicly-funded website which uses religion to promote evolution theory.
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Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation actually opposed barring taxpayer suits against executive branch

I assert that contrary to popular opinion, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, which I last discussed here, actually ruled in favor of allowing establishment-clause taxpayer suits against the executive branch and ruled against a distinction between Congressional and executive-branch spending in such suits. As I pointed out, the Hein opinions show that a 6-3 majority of the justices expressly opposed making a distinction between Congressional and executive-branch spending authorizations in regard to taxpayer standing in establishment clause cases, yet it is assumed that the court ruled in favor of this distinction! Following the line of reasoning -- based on the "Marks rule" discussed below -- that produced this crazy result, if Roberts and Kennedy had joined Scalia's opinion instead of Alito's, then Alito's resulting lone opinion in favor of this distinction would have overruled the other eight justices' opposition to this distinction!

Hein, is a "plurality opinion" decision, i.e., there is no majority opinion. Wikipedia says about plurality-opinion decisions,
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In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), the Supreme Court explained how the holding of a case should be viewed where there is no majority supporting the rationale of any opinion: “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [the majority], the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.

However, the Supreme Court has said that the courts have found it difficult or impossible to apply this "Marks rule" or have disagreed about whether the Marks rule should be applied in specific instances. In Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738, 745-746 (1994), the Supreme Court said,

In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), we stated that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, `the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .' " Id., at 193, quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, n. 15 (1976). This test is more easily stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the result in Baldasar. A number of Courts of Appeals have decided that there is no lowest common denominator or "narrowest grounds" that represents the Court's holding. See, e. g., United States v. Castro Vega, 945 F. 2d 496, 499-500 (CA2 1991); United States v. Eckford, 910 F. 2d 216, 219, n. 8 (CA5 1990); Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F. 2d 341, 345 (CA7 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). Another Court of Appeals has concluded that the holding in Baldasar is Justice Blackmun's rationale, Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F. 2d 887, 889 (CA10 1985); yet another has concluded that the "consensus" of the Baldasar concurrences is roughly that expressed by Justice Marshall's concurring opinion. United States v. Williams, 891 F. 2d 212, 214 (CA9 1989). State courts have similarly divided. [n.10] The Sentencing Guidelines have also reflected uncertainty over Baldasar. [n.11] We think it not useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts which have considered it. This degree of confusion following a splintered decision such as Baldasar is itself a reason for reexamining that decision. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 18-19); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). (emphasis added)

And in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003), the Supreme Court said,

In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts have struggled to discern whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale, set forth in part of the opinion joined by no other Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent under Marks. In that case, we explained that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." 430 U. S., at 193 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the divergent opinions of the lower courts demonstrate, however, "[t]his test is more easily stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the result in [Bakke]." Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738, 745-746 (1994). Compare, e. g., Johnson v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F. 3d 1234 (CAll 2001) (Justice Powell's diversity rationale was not the holding of the Court); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F. 3d 256, 274-275 (CA5 2000) (Hopwood II) (same); Hopwood I, 78 F.3d 932 (CA5 1996) (same), with Smith v. University of Wash. Law School, 233 F. 3d, at 1199 (Justice Powell's opinion, including the diversity rationale, is controlling under Marks).

The Marks rule ought to be repudiated and each plurality-opinion decision should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. Here is my interpretation of the Hein decision:

(1) There is no distinction between Congressional and executive-branch spending authorizations in regard to taxpayer standing in establishment clause cases. The Hein opinions show that a 6-3 majority of the justices expressly supported this position.

(2) Scalia's recommendation -- joined by only Thomas -- that taxpayer standing in establishment clause cases be completely eliminated -- i.e., a recommendation that Flast v. Cohen be overturned -- was just that, just a recommendation, and should be treated as dictum rather than an opinion of the court.

(3) The 3-justice "judgment of the court" (Alito's opinion) should be re-labeled "dissenting opinion" and the 4-justice "dissenting opinion" (Souter's opinion) should be re-labeled "judgment of the court."

(4) In accordance with the above rulings, the Freedom From Religion Foundation should have been granted standing to sue.

The Wikipedia article about plurality opinions has some errors. The Wikipedia article said,

. . .the plurality opinion did not receive the support of half the justices, but received more support than any other opinion.

In Hein, the opinion called the "judgment of the court" was a three-justice opinion and the opinion called the "dissent" was a four-justice opinion. Some consider Justice Powell's one-man opinion in Bakke to be the opinion of the court.

It is crucial to note that plurality opinions are not binding. They are often treated as majority opinions, because by the time a similar case is considered, a 5th Justice has come around. However, in reality, they are just interesting dicta, showing continued flux and ambivalence on the part of the Court.

Wrong -- plurality opinions are often treated as binding. A plurality opinion in Hein is treated as binding. Also, the above statement is self-contradictory -- majority opinions are binding, so a plurality opinion is binding if it is treated as a majority opinion.

Here is an article about the Marks rule.

Hopefully someday the Supreme Court will throw out the stupid taxpayer-standing idea completely. As I said, there is no fair way to apply this idea because some establishment clause violations are taxpayer-funded while others are not. There are other reasons why the taxpayer-standing idea is bad.
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More thoughts about Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, crazy decision about taxpayer standing in establishment clause cases

Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation (2007) is discussed in this external article and in articles [1] [2] on this blog.

First, I want to say that I think that the whole idea of taxpayer standing in establishment clause cases (as well as some other cases) is a crock, partly because some violations of the establishment clause involve tax spending while others do not. For example, according to Hein, there is no standing to sue over a religious symbol on public property if that symbol is funded by the executive branch. However, ironically Hein would not be a barrier to standing to sue if the religious symbol is privately funded, because then taxpayer standing would not be an issue because tax spending is not involved. If anything, it should be the other way around -- a government-funded religious symbol appears to be a bigger violation of the establishment clause than a privately-funded religious symbol, hence standing to sue should be stronger in the government-funded case. There are other reasons why the taxpayer-standing issue is a crock, but this one reason is sufficient. The whole taxpayer-standing issue really sucks big-time.

The Supreme Court's Hein decision is here. Here is a summary of the decision (authors of the opinions are shown in bold):
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"Judgment of the court" -- Alito, joined by Roberts and Kennedy

Opposed granting standing to sue. Held that in establishment clause cases, there should be taxpayer standing in challenges to Congressional authorization of spending but not in challenges to executive-branch authorization of spending (even where the funds originate from Congressional authorization). Called "judgment of the court" despite being a minority opinion, with even fewer justices than the "dissenting" opinion, 3 vs. 4.

Concurrence: Scalia, joined by Thomas

Opposed granting standing to sue. Held that there should be no taxpayer standing in establishment clause cases at all, i.e., that Flast v. Cohen should be overturned, or at least that the taxpayer-standing rules of Flast be applied to other kinds of challenges to government spending. However, opposed Alito's distinction between Congressional authorization and executive-branch authorization.

Dissent: Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer

Favored granting standing to sue. Like Scalia and Thomas, opposed Alito's distinction between Congressional authorization and executive-branch organization.

Concurrence: Kennedy, in addition to joining Alito's opinion, wrote a separate concurring opinion which does not enter into my analysis here.

So, in summary --

The court voted 5-4 to deny standing. However, it is assumed that Alito's distinction between Congressional spending and executive-branch spending is a binding ruling of the court, even though the opinions show that the justices are opposed by 6-3 against making that distinction (furthermore, even the decision's syllabus does not expressly indicate that this distinction is a binding ruling)! How can that be? The answer is in the following statement:

In a Supreme Court decision that does not have a majority opinion, such as Hein, the rationale of the narrowest opinion supporting the result becomes the controlling law. Therefore, the controlling opinion in Hein is the opinion that, first, found no standing for the plaintiffs in Hein, and, second, will eliminate standing for the least number of potential plaintiffs in future cases.

However, there ought to be a court rule that when a majority of the Supreme Court justices expressly oppose a particular ruling, as is the case here (6 justices opposed the distinction between Congressional and executive-branch spending authorizations), that particular ruling cannot be binding. Theoretically, the way things are now, it is possible for a single justice to make a binding ruling that is expressly opposed by the opinions of all the other justices. What if Roberts and Kennedy had joined in Scalia's opinion instead of Alito's? Then Alito's lone opinion would have been controlling. That's ridiculous.

Scalia and/or Thomas might have used the following reasoning: "we would really like to see this court either overturn Flast v. Cohen or at least apply the reasoning of Flast to other cases involving government spending, but since this court is not going to do that, we are going to join Souter's opinion so that we will at least block Alito's distinction between Congressional and executive-branch authorizations of spending." Scalia and Thomas essentially threw away their votes, except for the Pyrrhic victory of denying standing in this particular case.

BTW, here is a statement of Souter's opposition to Alito's distinction between Congressional and executive-branch authorization of spending:

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 102 (1968) , held that plaintiffs with an Establishment Clause claim could “demonstrate the necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the litigation to satisfy Article III requirements.” Here, the controlling, plurality opinion declares that Flast does not apply, but a search of that opinion for a suggestion that these taxpayers have any less stake in the outcome than the taxpayers in Flast will come up empty: the plurality makes no such finding, nor could it. Instead, the controlling opinion closes the door on these taxpayers because the Executive Branch, and not the Legislative Branch, caused their injury. I see no basis for this distinction in either logic or precedent, and respectfully dissent.

Scalia's following statement agrees with Souter's preceding statement:

As the dissent correctly contends and I shall not belabor, see post, at 3–4 (opinion of Souter, J.), Flast is indistinguishable from this case for purposes of Article III. Whether the challenged government expenditure is expressly allocated by a specific congressional enactment has absolutely no relevance to the Article III criteria of injury in fact, traceability, and redressability . . . . (emphasis in original)

Actually, Alito's distinction between Congressional and executive-branch authorization of funding is implicit in the following ruling from Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968):

. . . .a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, 8, of the Constitution. It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute.

The district court decision in Caldwell v. Caldwell (the UC Berkeley website case -- link to post-label group is at bottom of this article, also listed in the sidebar of the homepage) used the above ruling in Flast to argue that the plaintiff lacked federal taxpayer standing (see page 8 of decision). The Caldwell v. Caldwell district-court decision preceded the Supreme Court's Hein decision, so the similar ruling in Hein was not available. But the appeals court opinion in Caldwell v. Caldwell says -- without explanation -- that the taxpayer-standing issue was not appealed:

The district court held that Caldwell failed to make out taxpayer standing with respect to both the federal and state parties, an issue that is not appealed (page 6 of opinion)

Also, the appeals court decision, unlike the district court decision, does not mention the distinction between Congressional and executive-branch authorization of funding (Flast apparently uses the phrase "an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute" to describe executive-branch authorization). Anyway, federal taxpayer standing should probably not be an issue at all because I presume that the National Science Foundation -- which funded the website -- did not authorize webpages with religious messages. I will try to find out what happened to the taxpayer-standing issue in Caldwell v. Caldwell.
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The 9th Circuit's arbitrary, discriminatory rulings on standing in establishment clause cases

This blog has several articles about Caldwell v. Caldwell and several related articles. The Pacific Justice Institute announced that this lawsuit has been appealed to the US Supreme Court:

A lawsuit challenging a government-funded website that promotes the harmony of religion and evolution is being appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The website at the center of the controversy, operated by UC Berkeley and funded by a federal grant, is aimed at public school teachers. The website urges teachers to challenge students' religious beliefs that evolution contradicts their faith. Moreover, the site points teachers to statements from religious groups and denominations that support evolution, while ignoring religious groups that believe in a literal creation.

Attorneys with Pacific Justice Institute filed a petition with the Supreme Court this week after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff, a mother with children in Northern California public schools, did not have legal standing to challenge the website. By contrast, in most cases involving separation of church and state, the Ninth Circuit has been among the most lenient courts in the nation in allowing lawsuits to proceed. Just last week, in a case allowing atheists and lesbians to sue San Diego for letting the Boy Scouts use a public park, several dissenting Ninth Circuit judge sharply criticized the court's low threshold for legal standing.

The San Diego case is Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 04-55732. A news article said,
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This past June 11, the panel—again over Kleinfeld’s dissent—reiterated that the plaintiffs had standing, but for a different reason—that the plaintiffs’ choice not to use the facilities was made “because they are offended by the Boy Scouts’ exclusive, and publicly expressed disapproval, of lesbians, atheists, and agnostics.”

Yesterday, the court announced that a call for en banc rehearing failed to win the approval of a majority of unrecused active judges.

Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain dissented, joined by Kleinfeld and Judges Carlos Bea, Consuelo Callahan, Jay Bybee, and Sandra Ikuta.

O’Scannlain called the plaintiffs’ theory of standing “unprecedented” and said “[i]t splits standing law at the seams, forcing open the courthouse doors to plaintiffs without concrete, particularized injuries.”

Another news article said,

Lawsuits should only be available to plaintiffs with concrete injury, O'Scannlain wrote.

"Rather, the claim here is that the families are psychologically injured by the thought of associating with the Boy Scouts; they contend that they would be offended by the Boy Scouts' views if they chose to use the parks," he wrote. "This is an unprecedented theory."

There were no crosses or "god hates fags" signs on the properties. The plaintiffs were not expected to take an oath of belief in god in order to use the facilities. This lawsuit is like suing the UC Dept. of Paleontology because one does not want to use the department's government-sponsored website because one is offended by the fact that Darwinist crackpot Kevin Padian is on the department's staff.

O'Scannlain's complete dissent is here. The complete record of the 9th Circuit's opinions on the case is here.

BTW, the Boy Scouts are not leasing the land for free or virtually free -- the terms of the lease require the Boy Scouts to make millions of dollars worth of improvements to the properties. Also, the Boy Scouts apparently do not make a profit on rental fees charged to the public. Details are in this opinion.(pages 5-8)

The 9th Circuit federal court of appeals has 28 active judges -- only six voted to hold an en banc rehearing and four recused themselves, so unfortunately the vote was not even close. In the 9th circuit, en banc rehearing panels consist of 11 judges, fewer than the total number of active judges, 28 -- in all other circuits, en banc rehearing panels consist of all the active judges in the circuit. As happened here, judges will sometimes write opinions regarding a denial of an en banc rehearing -- another en banc rehearing denial where there was a written opinion was Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish, a case concerning an oral evolution disclaimer.

Fatheaded Ed Brayton of course agrees with the grant of standing to the plaintiffs, but he has no credibility because he is an unscrupulous BVD-clad blogger who arbitrarily censors comments that he does not agree with.

Also, in Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007), the 9th circuit granted standing to a complaint that the new L.A. county seal in is "an offensive anti-religious symbol" because it is a reminder that a cross that was in the old seal was removed! [1]. What remedy could the courts give other than to tell Los Angeles County to put the cross back in the seal?
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Originalism poisons the "Is the U.S. a Christian Nation?" debate

The debate is here on a website titled "Opposing Views." IMO a better title of the debate would be "Was the U.S. founded as a Christian nation," because that is the main topic of the debate. IMO we would not even be having this big debate were it not for the cockamamie doctrine of "originalism," the notion that court decisions should be controlled by the beliefs of the Founders. Many originalists believe that the Founders beliefs should be controlling even when those beliefs are not expressed, implied, or even suggested in the Constitution. Even if we could agree about the beliefs of the individual Founders, there would still be the problem of which Founders' views to emphasize -- for example, the religion-related views (I use the term "religion-related" because some Founders who supported the establishment clause might have been very religious) of Washington have been conveniently ignored while the religion-related views of Jefferson and Madison have been emphasized. The originalists have never even explained why court decisions should give the Founders' beliefs extra weight, let alone explained why the Founders' beliefs should be controlling. In the area of the establishment clause, originalism has completely destroyed objectivity in the study of the Founders' beliefs about religion and church-state separation -- e.g., as a result of originalism, the Founders have been portrayed as everything from a bunch of bible-pounding holy-rolling fundies to a bunch of godless blasphemous atheists.
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As I have said many times, one of the worst examples of originalism is Judge John E. Jones III's statement in his Dickinson College commencement speech that his Kitzmiller v. Dover decision was based on his cockamamie notion that the Founders based the establishment clause upon a belief that organized religions are not "true" religions. Ironically, he gave the speech while standing behind the Dickinson College seal, which was designed by USA Founders Benjamin Rush and John Dickinson and which contains a picture of an open bible and the college motto in Latin, "religion and learning, the bulwark of liberty."

IMO the history of American colleges and universities is a better indication of the probable religion-related beliefs of the founding generation than are quote mines of individual Founders. The website of the University of Virginia says (boldness added),

The University of Virginia was founded as a secular university, with no religious affiliation or denominational identity. In contrast, Georgia, UNC, South Carolina, Vermont, Blount College (which became the University of Tennessee), and others chartered as state universities had denominational sponsorship.

Chapel attendance was not required of students at the University of Virginia. Other universities, public and private, required their students to attend church services. In fact, Harvard did not do away with the chapel requirement until late in the 19th century.

For Jefferson, the college experience should take place within an "academical village," a place where shared learning infused daily life. Plans were developed for ten Pavilions—stately faculty homes with living quarters upstairs and classrooms downstairs—attached to two rows of student rooms and connected by an inward-facing colonnade.

At the head of the shared lawn would stand the library (not, as in most other colleges and universities of the time, a chapel), . . . .

U.Va. could be exaggerating here because it has an ax to grind -- it wants to give itself an image of being an innovator in higher education. Still, though, I think the above claims about religion's influence in higher education -- particularly at public universities -- are worth checking out. BTW, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill was the first public university in the USA and was founded in 1789, the same year in which North Carolina ratified the Bill of Rights, which of course contains the establishment clause. It is noteworthy that the best-known buildings at the Air Force Academy and the US Military Academy at West Point are the chapels -- in fact, the chapel is regarded as a symbol of the Air Force Academy.

I have no general interest in whether the USA is a Christian nation or not, or in whether it was founded as a Christian nation or not. I just don't like to see the establishment clause being misused the way that Darwinists are misusing it.
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Another summary of Caldwell v. Caldwell

This news article is another summary of the 9th Circuit appeals court's Caldwell v. Caldwell decision. The arbitrariness and capriciousness of the judges' reasoning are readily apparent.

The National Center for Science Education also has a summary of the decision.

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