This post is a long one, so I decided to make a table of contents:
1) Introduction
2) First Amendment requires fairness doctrine for blogs
3) The phony "privacy" argument
4) Unwanted blog comments have a very low nuisance level
5) The FCC fairness doctrine and
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 6)
Reno v. ACLU is about Internet obscenity, does not apply
7) 47 USC §230, "Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material," does not apply to censorship of inoffensive material
8)
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974) is about newspapers, does not apply and is worthless crap anyway
9) Open challenge to a debate about a fairness doctrine for blogs
Larry Fafarman
Founder, Association of Non-Censoring Bloggers
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1) Introduction To me, the term "fairness doctrine" -- originally used by the FCC -- means a requirement that publicly accessible sources of information -- e.g., TV, radio, newspapers, magazines, and blogs and other websites -- make reasonable efforts to give all views a fair opportunity to be heard. On blogs, this means no arbitrary censorship of visitors' comments.
I have already argued ad nauseam on this blog in favor of a "fairness doctrine" for blogs (and remarkably, I even have some new arguments to make here). In summary, the reasons for such a fairness doctrine are as follows:
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(1) The more popular blogs have become major de facto public forums. Nowhere does the First Amendment say that bloggers on the more popular blogs are more equal than others in regard to the right to influence public opinion.
(2) Blogs are being authoritatively cited by court opinions, scholarly journal articles, official news services, and other authorities. Blogs which lack reliability and fairness because of arbitrary censorship of comments should not be authoritatively cited.
(3) The unlimited comment space on blogs means that there is no need to pick and choose comments for posting. This is discussed further in the next section on the First Amendment.
I have also proposed a fairness-doctrine exemption for blogs that have a prominently posted "freedom-of-speech disclaimer" notice stating that comments are subject to arbitrary censorship (I feel that this exception is needed because the sole purpose of some blogs is to promote or advertise a political candidate, commercial product, etc.).
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2) First Amendment requires fairness doctrine for blogs
The First Amendment actually contains two freedom-of-expression clauses: (1) a "freedom-of-speech" right for individuals and (2) a "freedom-of-the-press" right for the media (though blogs often just represent individuals, blogs are often classified as belonging to the "media" for purposes of the First Amendment). I assert that there must be a truly compelling reason to infringe on one of these two rights for the purpose of protecting the other, and that such a compelling reason does not exist in the case of blogs because the unlimited space for visitors' comments means that there is no need to pick and choose visitors' comments for posting. In fact, according to the Darwinists' argument that the establishment clause is the most important clause in the Bill of Rights because it appears first, the freedom-of-speech clause should have priority over the freedom-of-the-press clause because the former clause precedes the latter. The same kind of constitutional pecking-order argument has been made about the 2nd Amendment. However, I feel that the order of appearance of amendments and clauses in the Bill or Rights has nothing to do with their relative importance.
Also, I feel that a fairness-doctrine exemption for bloggers who prominently post the above-described "freedom-of-speech disclaimer" would provide protection for bloggers who want to be allowed to arbitrarily censor comments.
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3) The phony "privacy" argument
Opponents of a "fairness doctrine" for blogs hocus-pocus that the blogs of BVD-clad bloggers are "private" and therefore immune from government regulation. But these same folks see nothing wrong with the idea of the government giving these "private" BVD-clad bloggers special protections and privileges, e.g., (1) immunity from liability for material left on their blogs by visitors, even when the bloggers are aware of the material, and (2) the "reporter's privilege," i.e., the right to keep their sources secret. There are already several laws governing blogs -- a "fairness doctrine" would just be another law.
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4) Unwanted blog comments have a very low nuisance level
One relevant factor that I have not yet considered on this blog is the nuisance-level issue for unwanted communications. For example, unwanted telemarketing phone calls are obviously a big nuisance. The government therefore created a National Do Not Call Registry for those who do not want to receive unsolicited telemarketing calls. But there is no National Do Not Send Registry for postal junk mail because this mail has a low nuisance level and because it would be too much trouble for the post office to sort out the junk mail. And blog comments -- unless they are intended to harass -- have a very low nuisance level; they are silent and do not have to be read or answered by the blogger. So the very low nuisance level of blog comments is another very strong argument in favor of a fairness doctrine for blogs.
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5) The FCC fairness doctrine and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
The now-dormant FCC fairness doctrine for broadcasters was upheld by the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969). A webpage of "Exploring Constitutional Conflicts" says,
. . .Red Lion Broadcasting v Federal Communications Commission . . . considers the constitutionality of a FCC rule requiring broadcasters to notify individuals who have been personally attacked in their programming, and to offer the attacked individual a chance to respond over the airwaves. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the FCC rule, concluding that scarcity of available spectrum space justified regulating broadcasting to ensure a diversity of voices.
It appears that opposition to a "fairness doctrine" for the Internet is largely based on the following three authorities: (1) Reno v. ACLU (1997), (2) 47 USC §230, and (3) Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974). I will show here that each of these three authorities is inapposite.
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6) Reno v. ACLU doesn't apply
The webpage of "Exploring Constitutional Conflicts" says,
In Reno v ACLU (1997), the Court considers what level of scrutiny should apply to content regulation of the Internet. The Court decides the the (sic) medium deserves the highest level of First Amendment protection, noting that anyone and everyone can develop a website--the scarcity rationale of Red Lion for greater regulation therefore has no application.
For the following reasons, I assert that the above statements do not apply to arbitrary censorship of comments on blogs:
(1) Reno v. ACLU is about censorship of Internet obscenity and not about arbitrary censorship of inoffensive comments on the Internet.
(2) The term "First Amendment protection" above refers only to freedom of the press and ignores freedom of speech.
(3) The term "scarcity rationale" above refers only to the issue of scarcity of "sites" ("sites" being radio and TV stations, websites, etc.) and ignores the very important issue of the scarcity of comment space per site. The latter issue was not an issue in Reno v. ACLU. As I noted above, the absence of scarcity of comment space on blogs means that there is no need to pick and choose comments for posting.
So although Reno v. ACLU is about censorship on the Internet, application of this precedent to the issue of arbitrary censorship of blog visitors' comments is grossly out of context. Pettifoggers just love to make blind, grossly out-of-context applications of precedents.
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7) 47 USC §230, "Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material," does not apply to censorship of inoffensive material
The very title of this law, "Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material", implies that this law does not apply to arbitrary censorship of inoffensive comments. A reading of this law shows that this law in fact does not apply to arbitrary censorship of inoffensive comments. The law gives bloggers two protections: (1) immunity from liability for visitors' comments and (2) immunity from liability for censorship of offensive visitors' comments. The statement of the first of these protections, 47 USC §230 (c)(1) says (for definitions of terms, see the law),
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
Actually, contrary to the law's title, "Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material," the above provision provides immunity from liability for failure to block, screen, or delete offensive and/or illegal material.
BTW, the above provision actually has the effect of encouraging bloggers to not censor visitors' offensive or even illegal comments because this provision immunizes the blogger from liability for visitors' comments that the blogger does not censor!
The law's section containing the second of these protections is,
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). (footnote: So in original. Probably should be “subparagraph (A)”)
Paragraph (A) above is the one that applies to bloggers. As for the term "otherwise objectionable," in the present context it would be stretching things to interpret this term as including any comment that a blogger disagrees with. BTW, as for the statement, "whether or not such material is constitutionally protected," IMO Congress has no power to create an exception to a constitutional protection. IMO the freedom-of-speech clause would protect an obscene comment that has some "redeeming" value, but would not protect an obscene comment that has no redeeming value. Anyway, the bottom line is that 47 USC §230 offers no protection from liability for censorship of inoffensive comments, e.g., censorship of a person's inoffensive rebuttal to a blog's defamatory statement about that person. So this means I could sue Fatheaded Ed Brayton and Sleazy PZ Myers for refusing to post my rebuttals to defamatory statements that they make about me on their blogs. Furthermore, 47 USC §230 is just a law and not a constitutional protection, and therefore is subject to legislative change.
Paragraph (B) applies to Internet Service Providers, blog services, etc.. What this paragraph says is that an ISP, blog service, etc. cannot be sued for giving "information content providers" -- e.g., bloggers -- the ability to delete or block comments. That's nice to know.
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8) Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974) doesn't apply and is worthless crap anyway
In this decision, the Supreme Court struck down Florida's "right of reply" statute that granted a political candidate a right to equal space to answer criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper. I assert that this precedent does not apply to arbitrary censorship of blog comments because comment space on blogs is unlimited whereas comment space in newspapers is limited. And not only does this decision not apply directly to blogs, but it is also a worthless piece of crap. For starters, this decision says,
It is correct, as appellee contends, that a newspaper is not subject to the finite technological limitations of time that confront a broadcaster, but it is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can proceed to infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the replies that a government agency determines or a statute commands the readers should have available. (pages 256-257) (emphasis added)
However, there was nothing in the Florida "right to reply" law that required an "infinite expansion" of a newspaper's column space -- this law strictly limited the length of replies, as follows:
The reply must appear in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the charges which prompted the reply, provided it does not take up more space than the charges. (page 244) (emphasis added)
Also, the "right to reply" law was absurdly compared to censorship:
The Circuit Court concluded that dictating what a newspaper must print was no different from dictating what it must not print. The Circuit Judge viewed the statute's vagueness as serving "to restrict and stifle protected expression." (page 245)
The Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified matter. (page 256)
If Florida's "right to reply" law is comparable to censorship, then the FCC "fairness doctrine" that was upheld in the Red Lion case is also comparable to censorship.
The Exploring Constitutional Conflicts webpage says,
It is interesting to contrast Red Lion with the Court's decision in Miami Herald v Tornillo, just five years later. . . . Despite the similarity of the question to that presented in Red Lion -- and the fact that Red Lion was the case most discussed in briefs for both parties -- the Court never even so much as mentioned Red Lion in a footnote! (emphasis added)
The relationship between Red Lion and Miami Herald is also discussed here.
The court even ignored its own highly applicable citations of precedents and other authorities, e.g.,
Proponents of enforced access to the press take comfort from language in several of this Court's decisions which suggests that the First Amendment acts as a sword as well as a shield, that it imposes obligations on the owners of the press in addition to protecting the press from government regulation. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), the Court, in rejecting the argument that the press is immune from the antitrust laws by virtue of the First Amendment, stated:
. . . Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford nongovernmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some . . .
(pages 251-252)
The approximately 30 bloggers on the Panda's Thumb blog constitute a "nongovernmental combination" that has conspired to impose restraints on others' freedom of speech.
It is noteworthy that although the US Supreme Court voted 9-0 against the "right to reply" law, the Florida Supreme court voted 8-1 to uphold this law! The citation for the Florida Supreme Court opinion is Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla., 1978) (per curiam, 8-1)
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9) Open challenge to a debate about a fairness doctrine for blogs
I am going to issue an open challenge over the Internet to a debate about a fairness doctrine for blogs. I will take all comers -- attorneys, law professors, judges, paralegals, legal secretaries, amateurs, BVD-clad bloggers, etc.. Pettifoggers are especially welcome! We can have the debate on my blog or on another blog. If this challenge is not answered within a reasonable time, I will declare victory by default.
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Labels: Fairness Doctrine, Internet censorship (new #1)
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